By Kateryna Odarchenko

Published on the Foreign Policy Research Institute

Bottom Line

• Russian disinformation campaigns effectively exploit societal vulnerabilities, reshaping public opinion and geopolitical dynamics. Through narratives like the “Russian World” and “Slavic Unity,” Moscow has influenced attitudes in countries such as Georgia, Ukraine, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, steering populations away from Western integration. These campaigns have sown distrust in NATO, undermined international support for Ukraine, and bolstered pro-Kremlin political movements by leveraging nostalgia, cultural ties, and anti-Western rhetoric.
• The infrastructure of Russian disinformation operates as an interconnected ecosystem, requiring substantial financial and logistical support. State-controlled media, private actors, the Russian Orthodox Church, and platforms like Telegram are critical enablers of these operations. Financial backers, including state-linked entities and cryptocurrencies, sustain this infrastructure, while logistical frameworks such as troll farms and Yandex amplify pro-Kremlin narratives. This coordination allows Moscow to adapt its strategies across diverse media landscapes, creating a pervasive influence.
• Targeting the financial and logistical lifelines of disinformation networks is key to countering their impact. Cutting off funding sources, regulating digital platforms, and disrupting coordination channels are essential to weakening these operations. Cases like Viktor Medvedchuk and proactive measures in Slovakia and the Czech Republic highlight the importance of dismantling disinformation ecosystems. Complementary actions, including media literacy and international cooperation, are crucial for safeguarding democratic values and institutions against future threats.

Introduction

Disinformation, the deliberate dissemination of false or misleading information to deceive or manipulate public opinion, represents a profound and ongoing threat to Western democracies. It erodes trust in institutions, fuels polarization, and undermines decision-making processes. Russian disinformation campaigns, in particular, showcase a sophisticated, multilayered system of narratives tailored to exploit societal vulnerabilities. Understanding their architecture and methodologies is critical for crafting effective countermeasures to safeguard democratic systems.

Moscow’s disinformation campaigns have achieved significant victories in reshaping public opinion and influencing geopolitical trajectories. In Georgia, Russian narratives have successfully steered segments of the population away from a Western-oriented path, fostering skepticism toward European integration and NATO membership. Similarly, these campaigns have undermined international support for Ukraine by spreading false narratives about the conflict, portraying Ukraine as a failed state or aggressor, and sowing doubts about the necessity of Western involvement. Moreover, Russia’s strategic use of disinformation has eroded trust in NATO, amplifying fears of alliance overreach and internal divisions. These successes highlight the dangerous efficacy of disinformation in advancing Moscow’s geopolitical agenda and emphasize the urgent need for robust counter-strategies.

Ways and Means of Disinformation

Russian disinformation operates as a well-coordinated ecosystem capable of deploying and adapting diverse narratives across multiple platforms. These narratives are strategically designed to evolve in intensity and variation, targeting the unique characteristics of the media environments and societies they infiltrate. Countries with complex media landscapes are especially vulnerable due to the multiplicity of audiences and channels. Key narrative categories include the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir), which solidifies identification with Russia among Russian-speaking populations, particularly in nations like Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine. The narrative of Slavic Unity leverages shared ethnic and historical ties to bolster support for Russia’s geopolitical agenda. Similarly, nostalgia for the Soviet era challenges Western-dominated global systems by portraying Russia as a counterbalance to perceived Western hegemony. Other narratives focus on “anti” rhetoric against the European Union, NATO, and liberal democratic values, resonating with far-right and nationalist movements in Europe. Finally, the strategy of presenting alternative and conflicting information seeks to erode the concept of objective truth, creating confusion and mistrust of credible sources.

The systemic nature of these campaigns relies on a network of state institutions, including the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Federal Security Service, alongside state-controlled media and private actors. Even the Russian Orthodox Church plays a strategic role in amplifying these messages. Counteracting such interconnected networks requires a holistic and targeted approach that goes beyond addressing individual narratives to dismantle the broader infrastructure.

A particularly insidious component of this ecosystem is the role of the Russian Orthodox Church and its affiliated organizations in advancing Kremlin-aligned narratives. Under the guise of anti-cult activities, these efforts marginalize minority religious communities while promoting Russian imperialist ideologies. The Russian Association of Centers for the Study of Religions and Sects (RACIRS), led by Alexander Dvorkin, exemplifies this strategy. Through seminars, publications, and collaborations with media outlets, RACIRS propagates divisive rhetoric abroad, often justifying Russia’s foreign and domestic policies, including the invasion of Ukraine. For instance, RACIRS has engaged in partnerships with pro-Russian groups in Central and Eastern Europe to influence public opinion.

Countering These Ways and Means 

Disrupting the financial and logistical mechanisms supporting these operations is essential to countering their destabilizing effects. Moscow’s disinformation campaigns rely heavily on a robust infrastructure of media outlets, online platforms, and state-sponsored entities that require consistent funding and operational resources to maintain their reach and influence. Cutting off financial resources can weaken their ability to hire skilled propagandists, purchase ad space, and amplify narratives through social media algorithms. Similarly, targeting logistical support—such as the technological infrastructure used to disseminate content or the networks facilitating coordination between actors—can severely hinder operational efficiency. By focusing on these critical pillars, the international community can degrade the capacity of disinformation networks, making them less effective in shaping public opinion or sowing discord globally. The significance of this approach becomes evident in examining cases like Viktor Medvedchuk, whose activities epitomize the Kremlin’s reliance on financial and logistical networks to fuel its influence campaigns.

The case of Medvedchuk, a Ukrainian oligarch and close confidant of Russian President Vladimir Putin, further illustrates the Kremlin’s strategy of leveraging influential figures to disseminate propaganda. Medvedchuk’s control of Ukrainian TV channels such as 112 Channel, News One, and Zik allowed him to saturate the media landscape with anti-Western narratives, particularly in Ukraine’s eastern and southern regions, where pro-Russian sentiment was already present. His activities were financed through Russian oil profits, and he employed social media troll factories to amplify his messaging and electoral bribery through the provision of “gifts” like food or cash during elections. Despite his arrest and subsequent exchange in 2022, Medvedchuk’s legacy underscores the need to dismantle the financial and media infrastructures that enable such disinformation. In addition to Ukraine, cases of electoral bribery orchestrated by Russian actors have also been documented in Estonia and Latvia. Investigative reports indicate that pro-Russian groups engaged in distributing money and goods to Russian-speaking minorities during local elections in these Baltic states, aiming to secure votes for candidates aligned with Kremlin interests. In Estonia, instances of cash payments and organized transportation to polling stations were linked to pro-Kremlin organizations, while in Latvia, similar tactics were employed in regions with significant Russian-speaking populations, leveraging socio-economic hardships to sway voter loyalty.

The export of Russian disinformation campaigns extends beyond Ukraine, as evidenced by case studies in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Since 2014, pro-Russian narratives have infiltrated Slovakia’s information ecosystem, leveraging embassies, intelligence operatives, and social media to position Russia as a protector of traditional values and a natural ally for Slavic nations. Historical revisionism and cultural appeals have bolstered support for pro-Kremlin parties like SMER-SD, led by Robert Fico. Fico’s rhetoric, which undermines Ukraine’s sovereignty and aligns Slovakia with Moscow’s interests, exemplifies the potent influence of these campaigns. Similarly, in the Czech Republic, media outlets such as “Voice of Europe,” linked to Medvedchuk’s network, disseminate narratives that oppose EU policies and undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty. Investigative reports reveal covert funding of pro-Russian candidates during European elections, often using cryptocurrency with obscure origins. However, the Czech Republic has demonstrated resilience through proactive measures, including government sanctions and public awareness campaigns, highlighting the effectiveness of coordinated counter-disinformation strategies.

Addressing the challenge of Russian disinformation requires a multifaceted approach, with a primary focus on dismantling the financial and logistical networks that sustain these operations. The interconnected nature of these supply chains—spanning state institutions, media outlets, private actors, and ideological platforms like RACIRS—demands a comprehensive response targeting the root of these campaigns. Efforts should prioritize cutting off funding sources, whether through sanctions or stricter regulations on the flow of dark money, cryptocurrencies, or other opaque financial channels used to support disinformation. The Medvedchuk case illustrates how a robust disruption of financial supply chains can neutralize even well-entrenched propaganda operations.

Moreover, combating logistical mechanisms such as troll farms, pro-Kremlin NGOs, and media outlets is essential to crippling the disinformation network’s reach and adaptability. By severing these critical lifelines, democracies can prevent the amplification of falsehoods and reduce the effectiveness of Kremlin-aligned narratives. Complementing these actions, public education initiatives and media literacy programs are vital for empowering citizens to resist manipulation. The examples of Slovakia and the Czech Republic underscore both the vulnerabilities inherent in democratic systems and the resilience that coordinated strategies can foster.

Disrupting these supply chains will protect institutions, rebuild public trust, and safeguard democratic values against the corrosive threat of Russian disinformation. This systematic approach ensures that the fight against disinformation is not merely reactive but anticipates and neutralizes threats at their origin.

Moreover, Moscow often leverages the same financial backers and logistical frameworks across multiple disinformation channels, creating interconnected networks that amplify their influence while simultaneously presenting multiple points of vulnerability. These entities, such as the notorious Internet Research Agency, receive substantial funding from state-controlled sources, enabling them to sustain large-scale operations that flood information ecosystems with pro-Kremlin narratives.

Logistically, Russian disinformation operations frequently utilize Telegram, a messaging platform with robust encryption and minimal content moderation, making it an ideal tool for coordinating campaigns and disseminating false information. The platform’s ability to create and manage numerous channels and groups allows disinformation actors to operate covertly, evading detection by traditional monitoring systems. Additionally, Yandex, Russia’s dominant search engine and technology provider, plays a dual role by not only supporting state-sponsored media outlets but also by developing algorithms that can be manipulated to prioritize Kremlin-aligned content.

These examples illustrate how intertwined financial and logistical support systems not only sustain disinformation operations but also create multiple avenues for intervention. By targeting key financial institutions, and regulating platforms such as Telegram and Yandex, the international community can effectively disrupt the lifelines of Russian disinformation campaigns. Enhanced transparency in financial transactions, stricter regulations on digital platforms, and international cooperation in monitoring and sanctioning involved parties are essential steps toward dismantling these pervasive networks.

Furthermore, the use of cryptocurrencies presents both a challenge and an opportunity. While they offer a means to obscure financial transactions, advancements in blockchain analysis and international regulatory frameworks can mitigate their misuse. Initiatives like the Financial Action Task Force guidelines on virtual assets are crucial in closing the loopholes that disinformation actors exploit to fund their operations anonymously.

Conclusion

Understanding the specific financial backers and logistical supporters of Russian disinformation campaigns reveals critical vulnerabilities that can be targeted to dismantle these operations effectively. By implementing comprehensive strategies that address both the monetary and operational aspects, democracies can significantly weaken the infrastructure that enables sustained and impactful disinformation efforts. This proactive approach not only curtails the immediate threat but also fortifies democratic institutions against future attempts at manipulation and destabilization.

Image by the Financial Times.